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Abstract 
In an attempt to incorporate human factors into technical failures as accident causal factors, researchers have promoted the concept of human 
factor analysis. Human factor analysis models seek to identify latent conditions within the system that influence the operator’s action to trigger 
an accident.  For an effective application of human factor analysis models, a domain-specific model is recommended. Most existing models 
are developed with category/subcategory peculiar to a particular domain. This presents challenges and hinders effective application outside 
the domain developed for. This paper sought to propose a human factor analysis framework for Ghana’s mining industry. A comparative study 
was carried out between three dominated accident causation models and investigation methods in literature; AcciMap, HFACS, and STAMP. 
The comparative assessment showed that HFACS is suitable for incident data analysis based on the following reason; ease of learning and 
use, suitability for multiple incident analysis and statistical quantification of trends and patterns, and high inter and intra-coder reliability. A 
thorough study was done on HFACS and its derivative. Based on recommendations and research findings on HFACS from literature, Human 
Factor Analysis, and Classification System – Ghana Mining Industry (HFACS-GMI) was proposed. The HFACS-GMI has 4 tiers, namely; 
External influence/factor, Organisational factor, Local Workplace/Individual Condition and, Unsafe Act. A partial list of causal factors under 
each tier was generated to serve as a guide during incident coding and investigation. The HFACS-GMI consists of 18 subcategories and these 
have been discussed. The HFACS-GMI is specific to the Ghanaian Mines and could potentially help in identifying causal and contributing 
factors of an accident during an incident investigation and data analysis.  
 




The mining sector since its commencement has been 
regarded as a hazardous profession and always at 
war with nature and its forces. Illness, injuries, and 
accidents are seen as part of the job, leaving safety 
practitioners and researchers with the tough task of 
identifying the latent and active failures within the 
system in the hope to prevent or mitigate future 
occurrences(Patterson and Shappell, 2009). As a 
safety-critical domain, the strategy adopted across 
the world is to control the accident frequency and 
severity through technological advancement 
(Amegbey et al., 2008). Although the sector has 
seen an improvement in safety, it is still recognized 
as one of the most high-risk professions across the 
world (Mitchell et al., 1998; Coleman and 
Kerkering, 2007). The sector only employs 1% of 
the global workforce but account for 8% of work-
related fatalities (Stemn, 2018). In South Africa, the 
mining industry recorded 51 fatalities in 2019 which 
is the lowest figure in the history of the industry 
(Farmer, 2020).  The South African mines also 
recorded 2406 and 2447 injuries in 2019 and 2018 
respectively (Farmer, 2020). From 2004 to 2019, the 
United State mining sector on average recorded 44 
fatalities each year and rated second-highest 
concerning the fatality rate recorded in the private 
sector in 2007(Poplin et al., 2008; Garside, 2020). 
In Ghana, the sector records on average 5 fatalities 
and 51 serious injuries every year (Stemn, 2018). 
These alarming figures are a clear indication that 
causal factors identification and analysis focused 
research is required in the mining industry.   
It is acknowledged that, without much 
understanding of accident causation models and 
theories, accidents will continue to occur within a 
complex sociotechnical system (Hollnagel, 2016). 
Understanding accident models and theories help in 
the identification of causal and contributing factors 
to accidents and inform apt system reforms and 
accident countermeasure development (Salmon et 
al., 2012). Development of appropriate 
countermeasures can only be achieved through 
incident investigation and analysis. Incident 
investigations and analyses are critical in ensuring 
one understanding of the underlying factors that 
contributed or initiated the accident as well as 
indicating the weakness in a system where safety 
can be improved (Salmon et al., 2012). For this to 
occur, the organisation must put in place a well-
structured procedure and process to ensure 
comprehensive incident data collection, quality 
investigation and analysis, and implementation of 
lessons and recommendations from the investigation 
and the analysis process (Stemn et al., 2018). 
Effective implementation of the lessons and 
recommendation within a system enable double-
loop learning and present opportunities for 
improving the system safety (Stemn et al., 2020). 
 
An accident occurs within a complex socio-
technical system as a result of the interaction 
between technological, environmental, human, and 
organisational factors (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 
2008). Losses occur when there is a failure in the 
defence or barriers at the technological, 
environmental, or organisational level which is 
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mostly triggered by the human factors as depicted in 
Fig. 1.   
 
Human factor has received significant attention in 
the field of incident investigation and analysis for 
the past ten years due to its contribution to the 
occurrence of accident (Newbold, 1926; Reason, 
1990; Gordon et al., 1996; Reason, 2000; Patterson 
and Shappell, 2010; Liu et al., 2018). Human factor 
according to the International Ergonomics 
Association is the interactions among humans and 
the sociotechnical component of a system taking 
into consideration ways to optimize human well-
being and improve the system's overall performance 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2013). The subcategory 
of the human factor which is given much attention 
in the industrial setting is the error component 
(Brehmer, 1993; Maiti and Bhattacherjee, 1999; 
Amegbey et al., 2008; Hosseinian and Torghabeh, 
2012). Error in this context refers to events in which 
a planned sequence of mental or physical activities 
fails to achieve its expected outcome (Reason, 
1990). Much attention is given to human error as it 
is the trigger of accidents. Adopting newton’s law of 
inertia to safety, a deficiency or failure within a 
system will remain latent unless acted upon by an 
external force (human error) which results in an 
accident.  
 
Recent models and studies on accident causation 
tend to look at accident/incidents taking into account 
the whole system and how the component within the 
system interact with each other(Reason et al., 2006; 
Von Thaden et al., 2006; De Landre et al., 2007; 
Shappell and Wiegmann, 2013). These shift the 
focus from a single element of accident causation 
(Human error) to system failures and deficiencies.  
These recent models and studies focus on the system 
or organisational approach to accident investigation 
and prevention to eliminate failures and deficiencies 
rather than identify culprits at the operating end.  
 
Fig. 1 System Component Interactions 
This study seeks to identify opportunities for 
improving the safety performance within the Ghana 
Mining industry through effective incident 
investigation by proposing a human factor Analysis 
framework for the Ghanaian Mining Setting. 
 
1.1 Human Error Taxonomies 
 
In an attempt to move from the concept of 
technological malfunction in accident causation, 
human error was introduced as the cause of 
accidents within the industrial setting in the mid-
twentieth century. This concept of human error 
considers the system as error-free and needs to be 
protected from humans at the operating end (Woods 
et al., 2010). With this assumption, the basic cause 
of accidents was associated with human error and 
the only way to prevent accidents or minimize its 
consequence is to improve the individual at the 
sharp end. In view to understand the contribution of 
human factor/error in accident causation, many 
human error models have been proposed. These 
models address human error from five perspectives; 
the psychosocial perspective (Helmreich and 
Foushee, 1993), the cognitive perspective 
(Rasmussen, 1982; Wickens and Flach, 1988), the 
ergonomic perspective (Edwards, 1988), the 
behavioral perspective (Petersen, 1978) and the 
epidemiological perspective (Suchman, 1961).   
 
However, recent models and researches on accidents 
have shifted the focus from human failure to system 
failures or deficiencies. (Woods et al., 2010). 
System approach models and studies seek to reveal 
the latent conditions(Reason, 1990), such as poor 
illumination, poor standard operating procedures, 
manufacturing defects, poor design, and 
maintenance failure, that created the conditions 
causing the operator to trigger the accident. With 
this line of research, human error is not considered 
as the basic cause of an accident but, rather as an 
outcome of a latent condition within the system. The 
system approach model, which seeks to understand 
the role of human error in accident causation and has 
gain must popularity and attention in safety 
literature is the Swiss-Cheese model.   
 
Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 
 
In an attempt to explain why and how an accident 
occurs within a complex system, Reason (1990) 
succeeded in his study on accident occurrences 
within complex systems and proposed the Swiss 
Cheese Model (SCM). The SCM represents the 
planes/levels; senior management/decision-maker, 
line management, precursor/precondition, 
production activities, and defences, of an 
organisation or a system as a slice of cheese and the 
deficiencies or failures; poor communication, poor 
equipment design, and maintenance, violation of 
safety procedure, in each plane/level as the holes 
within the cheese slice as shown in Fig. 2. The holes 
in the slice (deficiencies in the planes) are the active 
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and latent failures that cause nearly all accidents 
within an organisation (Reason, 2000), which is 
mostly triggered by the operator or the individual at 
the sharp end.  The system becomes susceptible to 
an accident when the hole in each plane in the 
system line up. Active failures are acts committed 
by the operator or the individual at the operating 
level resulting in an accident, which is mostly 
referred to as the immediate cause of the accident. 
Latent conditions are error provoking conditions or 
situations that create long-lasting holes or 
weaknesses in the defence of the system (Reason, 
2000). These conditions remain dormant within the 
system until it combines with an active failure and a 
trigger to create an accident opportunity. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the SCM mark I was modified 
(SCM Mark II) to reduce the four productive levels 
to three, organisation, workplace/task, and 
individual, with an extension of the defences plane 
from one to three as shown in Fig. 3. The 
modification was necessary, to give specific and 
detailed understanding with regards to how each 
level of the system contribute to the occurrences of 
accident (Reason et al., 2006). The SCM II 
introduces a latent path leading from the 
organisation level directly to the defence planes. 
This pathway account for accidents such as 
Challenger and Piper Alpha accident, in which there 
was no immediate active failure, (Reason et al., 
2006).  
 
While the SCM I and SCM II give a conceptual idea 
on how an accident occurs, they failed to give a clear 
and detailed explanation of the stages in the 
development of organisational accident/incident and 
how to investigate these accidents to find the causes 




Fig. 2 SCM Mark I (Reason et al., 2006) 
 
 
Fig. 3 SCM Mark II Adapted (Reason et al., 2006) 
 
To fill this gap, Reason in 1997, developed the third 
version of the SCM (see Fig. 4), taking into account 
the path or direction to find causes and investigate 
accidents (Reason, 2016). With the SCM III, the top 
rectangular block indicates the main elements of an 
accident/incident whereas the triangular shape 
below illustrates the system producing the event. 
The red arrow indicates the direction for accident 
causation and the black indicate the step to 
investigate an event. The SCM III focuses on the 
barriers, controls, defences, and safeguards within 
the planes of the system.  
 
 
Fig. 4 SCM III Adapted (Reason, 2016) 
1.2 Human Factor Accident Causation 
Models 
 
Whenever an accident/failure occurs within a socio-
technical system, it is the organisation’s concern to 
find out in detail exactly which defence fails. To 
meet this hard-hitting task, researchers over the 
years have developed conceptual models to unravel 
the mysteries of accident causation. Some of these 
models aid in understanding how incidents occur in 
theory whereas others are very useful in 
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accident/incident investigation. These models help 
investigators to gain a detailed understanding of the 
causal and contributing factors of an accident so that 
effective corrective actions can be recommended 
and implemented. Examples of human factor 
accident causation models and investigation 
methods that dominate the literature include risk 
management framework and AcciMap (Rasmussen, 
1997; Rasmussen and Suedung, 2000; Svedung and 
Rasmussen, 2002), Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003) and Systems Theoretic Accident 
Model and Processes Model (STAMP) (Leveson, 
2004) 
 
1.2.1 Risk Management Framework and AcciMap 
 
Rasmussen (1997) proposed a risk management 
Framework for accident investigation and analysis, 
popularly known as AcciMap as a contribution to 
understanding accident causation in a typical 
sociotechnical system. With the rapid advancement 
and complexity in technology, organisations are left 
with no option but to develop complex structures to 
ensure their safe operation. The operation of these 
structures is mostly influenced by dynamic 
environmental conditions such as economic and 
political pressure, legislation, market competition, 
and increasing awareness of safety which in the long 
run influences the work practice and human 
behaviour (Rasmussen, 1997). Existing causal 
model although study or consider the rapid 
technological advancement and its complexity, they 
fail to assess the influence of these dynamic 
environmental conditions in the operation of these 
complex systems. Rasmussen (1997) argued that the 
complex system together with the dynamic 
environmental conditions should be considered as 
one entity during risk management and how 
decisions and actions at each level interact to 
influence the performance of the system. The 
AcciMap model gives a graphical representation of 
system-wide failures, decisions, and actions 
contributing to the occurrence of an accident. The 
AcciMap method focuses on six organisational 
level: government policy and budget; regulatory 
bodies and associations; company planning and 
budgeting; physical processes and actor activities; 
and equipment and surroundings and analyses how 
these levels interact with one another to shape the 
occurrence of an accident. The risk management 
framework and AcciMap method, have been used 
widely to analyse accident (Johnson and De 
Almeida, 2008; Debrincat et al 2013; Salmon et al 
2014; Underwood and Waterson, 2014; Newnam 
and Goode, 2015; Kee et al 2017; Zhang et al 2018). 






Until Reason (1990) proposed the swiss cheese 
model, industries for centuries have always embrace 
human error as a sequential theory. The introduction 
of the SCM in 1990, changed the industrial 
perspective of human error, and industries began to 
examine it systemically. Although, the SCM became 
popular and was extensively applied across 
industries, the absence of taxonomies of active and 
latent failures within the levels of the SCM limited 
its usefulness for accident analysis in some 
industries such as aviation (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003). To address this gap, Wiegmann and 
Shappell (2003), developed taxonomies for each 
level within the SCM I and name the proposed 
“SCM I with taxonomies” Human Factor Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS). Currently, in 
the field of accident causation, HFACS is one of the 
most extensively applied tools for human factor 
analysis(Harris and Li, 2011). The HFACS serve as 
a practical tool for investigators, analyst, and safety 
professionals (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003), 
which enable them to systematically categorized the 
causes of accident/incidents. The HFACS structure 
is hierarchical, with nineteen causal factors 
categorized under four levels of failure. Deficiencies 
within the four levels include an active failure: 
unsafe act; and latent conditions: precondition for 
unsafe act; unsafe supervision and organisation 
influences, with each upper level influencing the 





With the essential changes in the aetiology of 
accident due to technological advancement, 
Leveson (2004) argues that existing accident 
causation models fail to take into account 
accidents/failures that may result from the use of 
digital systems and software. Leveson argues that 
digital systems and software introduces new failure 
modes and must be accounted for in accident 
investigation and analysis to prevent future 
occurrences. Existing accident causation models 
mostly focus on the electromechanical component 
and how it is protected against human failure. 
Leveson (2004) is of the view that this changes and 
advancement in technology stretches the limit of the 
current model and proposed the System-Theoretic 
Accident Modelling and Process (STAMP) model 
which take into account digital system and software 
failure, cognitive complex human activities and 
societal and organisational influence during risk 
assessment, incident investigation and incident data 
analysis. Whereas existing accident models are 
event-based, the STAMP model is a constraint-base. 
With the STAMP model, accident occurs as a result 
of inadequate control of component failures, 
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dysfunctional interaction and external disturbance. 
To prevent accident within a socio-technical system, 
safety constraints are imposed from the upper level 
on the lower levels on mechanisms and factors that 
influence human behaviour to trigger an accident. 
The model assesses the socio-technical system as 
hierarchical levels of control with each level 
imposing safety constraints on the level 
below.  The STAMP model proposed the following 
taxonomy of control failure: (1) inadequate control 
of action; (2) inadequate or missing feedback; (3) 
inadequate execution of control of actions (see Fig. 
7). Due to the model’s origination from the 
engineering setting, current applications such as 
Ouyang et al. (2010) have introduced the “mental 










Fig. 6 HFACS Taxonomies Overlaid on SCM I (Salmon et al 2012) 
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Fig. 7 STAMP Taxonomies and Socio-Technical Safety Control Structure (Salmon et al 2012) 
 
2 Resources and Methods Used  
 
2.1 Comparison of AcciMap /HFACS 
/STAMP 
 
With the recent shift from finding a single cause of 
accidents to understanding the failures in a dynamic 
complex system such as organisational or 
management deficiencies, accident theory/model 
has also evolved from the chain model (Domino 
theory); and human behaviour and actions model 
(cognitive reliability and error analysis model) to 
system analysis model (such as AcciMap, STAMP, 
and HFACS). The system analysis models allow the 
investigator to consider both blunt end factor 
(management level, government, and regulatory 
agencies) and sharp end factor (operator acts) that 
contributed to the occurrences of the accident and 
also analyse the relationship or influence between 
the blunt end and the sharp end. The application or 
use of a particular system analysis model for 
accident analysis or investigation depends on three 
variables namely usability/ease of learning, the 
validity of its analysis, and reliability of its analysis.  
The usability of a system-based model is mostly 
influenced by the features of the model, the 
characteristic of the investigator/analyst, the type of 
incident under investigation or analysis, and the 
technical, organisation, and physical environment of 
the socio-technical system (Cathy and Nigel, 1996). 
Considerable knowledge is required for novice users 
in the application of AcciMap, HFACS, and 
STAMP for incident analysis. Effective application 
of the STAMP model for accident analysis requires 
in-depth knowledge and understanding; and control 
theory concept (Igene and Johnson, 2019) as 
compared to AcciMap and HFACS. Despite the 
easier use of the AcciMap as compare to the STAMP 
model, guidelines are required for correct 
identification and placement of contributing factors 
at the appropriate level and mapping causal 
relationships between them (Igene and Johnson, 
2019). The taxonomic nature of the HFACS enables 
easy application and ease of learning, compare to 
AcciMap, although it has its root from the aviation 
setting  (Salmon et al 2012; Zhang et al 2018). 
HFACS has been successfully applied in the mining 
sector (Patterson and Shappell, 2009; Lenné et al 
2012; Liu et al 2018) with little or no alteration for 
accident analysis in the identification of causal 
factors of an accident. Little is known about the 
applicability of the AcciMap and the STAMP in the 
mining industry. Even though the AcciMap and 
STAMP are quite flexible in their application as 
compare to the HFACS (Salmon et al 2014; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2014), they cannot 
statistical quantify the relationship among 
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contributory factors (Wang et al 2018; Zhang et al 
2018) and not suitable for multiple accident data 
analysis (Salmon et al 2012; Zhang et al 2018; Igene 
and Johnson, 2019). 
 
The AcciMap, STAMP, and HFACS were all 
developed with the objective of modelling a socio-
technical system when a failure occurs to determine 
the contributing factors. Each model although 
applied a different methodological approach for 
incident analysis, they were all developed based on 
a recognized accident causation theory or principle 
and have been adopted in different domains for 
incident data analysis (Salmon et al 2012; 
Underwood and Waterson, 2014). Most 
practitioners or researches measure the validity of a 
model by comparing the output to set 
recommendation from multiple analysts or expert 
opinion (Igene and Johnson, 2019), little of such 
study exist for the validation of the Accimap, 
STAMP, and HFACS model.  
 
Reliability of a model is referred to as the extent to 
which the model upon its repeated application or 
trail yields the same result (Carmines and Zeller, 
1979). Reliability in this context is measured or 
determined in two ways; intra-rater and inter-rater 
reliability. Inter-rater reliability measures the degree 
of agreement of the outcome of different analysts 
classifying failure within a system whereas intra-
rater reliability measures the consistency of an 
analyst over time in classifying failure within a 
system (Olsen, 2013; Ergai et al 2016). The HFACS 
due to its taxonomic nature, measure both 
high inter and intra-reliability as compare to the 
AcciMap and the STAMP(Salmon et al 2012). 
Research on the reliability of the HFACS models 
has been successful and exhibited an acceptable 
level of reliability (79%) (Ergai et al 2016) whereas 
other works measured lower reliability, 52% 
(O'connor, 2008), 39.9% (Olsen and Shorrock, 
2010) and 35.6% (Olsen, 2011). Few studies exist 
on the reliability of the STAMP and AcciMap 
model. Goncalves Filho et al. (2019) in their inter-
rater reliability study of the STAMP and the 
AcciMap observed high reliability with the STAMP 
(68%) than the AcciMap model (38%), which is 
below the benchmark of 70% as suggested by 
Baysari et al. (2011), Olsen (2011), Olsen and 
Shorrock (2010) and Wallace and Ross (2006). The 
summary of the comparative assessment between 
AcciMap, HFACS, and STAMP are presented in 
Table 1. 
 
From the comparison analysis, HFACS is 
recommended for incident/accident analysis in the 
Ghanaian mining industry base on the following 
reasons: 
(i) Ease of learning and use due to its 
taxonomic nature  
(ii) Suitable for multiple accident/incident data 
analysis and statistical quantification of 
patterns and trends among contributing 
factors (Li and Harris, 2006; Tvaryanas et al 
2006).  
(iii) High inter and intra-coder reliability as 
compared to the STAMP and AcciMap 
model. 
 




AcciMap HFACS STAMP 
Usability/Ease of 
learning 
Novice × √ × 
Expert/Specialist  √ × √ 
Multiple incident Analysis × √ × 
Trends and path Analysis  √ √ × 
Statistical Quantification  × √ × 
Flexibility  √ × √ 
Reliability 
Inter-rater  √ √ √ 
Intra-rater × √ × 
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3 Results and Discussion  
 
3.1 HFACS and Its Derivatives  
 
While the HFACS framework was initially 
developed and applied successfully in military 
aviation for accident analysis, other industrial 
settings have also successfully applied the HFACS 
framework in their domain for accident analysis 
with little or no alteration. Most 
alterations/modifications made were to address the 
deficiency in the HFACS framework, not taking into 
account the influence of external factors such as 
government and regulatory bodies in accident 
occurrences. These include the marine, HFACS-MA 
(Chen et al 2013); coal mining, HFACS-CM (Liu et 
al 2018) and HFACS-IM (Patterson and Shappell, 
2010); railway, HFACS-RR (Reinach and Viale, 
2006); oil and gas, HFACS-OGI (Theophilus et al 
2017); and aviation, HFACS-ADF (Inglis et al 
2010)and HFACS-ME (Rashid et al 2010). Fig. 8 
shows the key modifications made to the original 
HFACS framework for use in several different 
domains or sectors.  
 
Although the issues of external influences or factors 
have been addressed in most of the derivatives, most 
of the subcategories such as misinterpretation of 
traffic calls and hypoxia are not applicable outside 
the aviation industry. Salmon et al. (2012) and Olsen 
and Williamson (2017) argue that for effective usage 
and achievement of high reliability outside the 
military aviation setting, the HFACS framework 
should be made domain-specific. The HFACS 
framework is underpinned by the SCM mark I, 
though the layers from SCM mark I have been 
modified (Reason et al 2006), reducing the 
levels/layers from four to three in the SCM mark III. 
Modification of the HFACS framework base on the 
SCM mark III could result in a reduction in the size 
of the coding system, which is acknowledged as a 
key factor to attaining high reliability(Olsen and 
Williamson, 2015; Olsen and Williamson, 2017). 
Based on these reasons, a modified HFACS 
framework, HFACS-GMI, is proposed for the 
Ghana Mining Industry. 
  
3.2 HFACS-GMI Framework 
 
The framework proposed is a derivative of the 
HFACS proposed by Wiegmann and Shappell 
(2003). The modified framework by the authors was 
based on the SCM III proposed by James Reason, 
with input to better correlate to the Ghanaian mining 
industry. 
 
The modified framework, Human factor Analysis, 
and Classification System – Ghana Mining Industry 
(HFACS-GMI) have 4 tiers, namely; External 
influences/Factors, Organisational Factor, Local 
Workplace/Individual Conditions, and Unsafe Act. 
The addition of external factors/influences was 
based on recommendations proposed by several 
scholars (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Patterson and 
Shappell, 2010; Salmon et al 2012; Liu et al 2018; 
Igene and Johnson, 2019). The organisational 
factors level was adopted from the original 
framework with some alterations including 
renaming; organisational climate to corporate 
climate, resource management to management 
decision, and organisational processes to operational 
processes. A new tier, local workplace/individual 
conditions, was introduced. At this tier, the term 
‘leadership’ was preferred to ‘supervision’ because, 
in the mining setting, there are some peoples who 
are not supervisors (e.g. site foreman and shift boss) 
but oversees the activities of the worker and also to 
eliminate instance where coders may refer to the 
term supervision as the operator’s immediate 
supervisor (Patterson and Shappell, 2010) during 
incident data analysis. With the Unsafe act tier, the 
category of the error was changed to slip, lapse, and 
mistake. The violation term was also renamed to 
contravention. Fig. 9 shows the proposed HFACS-
GMI framework, thick lines, and short dashes 
indicating the category and subcategory under each 
tire respectively. 
 
3.3 Description of HFACS-GMI Tiers 
 
3.3.1 External Influences/Factors 
 
Research on accident investigation and analysis has 
proven that factors contributing to accidents go 
beyond the organisational factor or level (Chen et al 
2013). Companies or organisations do not operate in 
isolation but within a certain environment govern by 
regulations, laws, and standards. These factors as 
well as the conditions within which the organisation 
operate can influence their activities and considered 
as a contributing factor to a mishap as shown in the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout of 2010 investigations 
finding (Theophilus et al 2017). These external 
influences/factors include; political/economic 
factors, national regulatory factors, and international 
industrial standards.  
 
In the Ghanaian setting, the mining sector is 
regulated under the Minerals and Mining 
Regulation, 2012, with health and safety under LI 
2182. This LI 2182 (Health, Safety, and Technical) 
is enforced by the Inspectorate Division of the 
Minerals Commission. The LI 2182 mandates the 
Inspectorate division to regulate and give guidance 
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Fig. 9 Human Factor Analysis and Classification System-Ghana Mining Industry (HFACS-GMI) 
Framework 
Lapses in the responsibility of the Inspectorate 
Division could result in suboptimal enforcement of 
the regulation and inadequate guidance on health 
and safety concerns which could be a major 
contributing factor to accidents occurred within the 
mines. 
 
The Mines for effective management and control of 
work-related hazards have adopted some 
international standards such as the ISO 45001 and 
ISO 31001. These industrial standards give guidance 
on the management and control of health and safety 
issues and concerns within the workplace as well as 
measures for effective implementation. Deficiencies 
within the standards could affect the management 
and control of workplace hazards. Apart from this, 
there are also standards and guidelines from industry 
peak bodies such as the Ghana Chamber of Mines, 
International Council for Mining and Metals, which 
can affect the safety of a mine and contribute to the 
occurrence of accidents.  
 
In terms of political factors, the absence of 
occupational health and safety law and national 
industrial standards for workplace health and safety 
could be one of the causes of safety-related mine 
accident. Some sections of the adopted standards do 
not fit into the Ghanaian industrial setting and this 
affects their effective implementation in the 
management and control of work-related accidents. 
Economic factors such as reduction in gold prices, 
high taxation, and royalty can force the mines to 
reduce their investment in safety in order to cut 
down costs. The economic pressures can also result 
in the lay-off of employees in order to reduce costs. 
This increases the workload of the worker and 
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3.3.2 Organisational Factors 
 
The organisational factor is the third tier of the 
framework. These deficiencies and failures are 
latent conditions provoke by the highest levels of the 
organisation. Identification of these causal factors 
during incident investigation and analysis is quite 
difficult because top management mostly presides 
over investigation activities and are not ready to 
assign the blame to the organisation for fear of 
liability. Three causal factors are considered under 
this tier: Management decision, Operational process, 
and Corporate climate. Management decision refers 
to the corporate decision and priority concerning the 
allocation of the company’s resources and 
maintenance of its assets such as its human resource 
and equipment. Corporate climate refers to the 
organisation’s policies, culture, and structure which 
reflect the working atmosphere of the organisation 
at any given time. The structure refers to the 
organogram and the order of command employed 
within the organisation. The culture reflects the 
fundamental beliefs, values, norms, attitude, and 
customs that resides within the framework of the 
organisational system. The policies refer to written 
and unwritten procedures that govern all activities 
and operations within the organisation. Operational 
processes refer to the day-to-day processes (e.g. 
operational tempo and schedules) and procedures 
(e.g. Standard Operation Procedure (SOP)) that 
governs the operations of the organisation. 
 
3.3.3 Local Workplace/Individual Conditions  
 
These are error provoking or violation-producing 
conditions within the organisation. These latent 
conditions influence the behaviour and actions of the 
operators to engage in an unsafe act that triggers an 
accident. Causal factors consider under this tier are; 
Task/job factors: leadership flaw, 
communication/coordination and failure to 
access/correct known hazards; Environmental 
factors: physical environment and technological 
environment; and Operator’s conditions: fitness for 
duty, physical/mental limitation, and adverse 
physiological/mental state.  
 
People with leadership roles within the mines are 
often tasked with the responsibility of providing 
employees with the opportunity to operate safely 
and also ensure a good culture with respect to 
established law and regulations. Leadership flaw in 
the context refers to the act of leaders that allows the 
breeding of violation and oversights within the 
organisation. Communication and coordination are 
means through which management relay instruction, 
procedures, and information to its employees and 
also means for getting feedback from the employees. 
Poor communication and coordination could result 
in a misperception of a given instruction or 
procedure and a breakdown in the organisational 
pathway and teamwork toward the achievement of 
its safety goal. Failure to access/correct known 
hazards is referred to instances where a supervisor 
allows for unnecessary risk due to improper 
assessment of the hazards associated with 
operation/activity or failure to correct a known 
hazard that could provoke an unsafe act or situation. 
  
The Physical environment refers to the ambient and 
working surroundings such as the lighting, noise 
levels, and workshop layout, of the operator whereas 
the technological environment, focuses on 
equipment design and control, display/interface 
features, automation, and checklist outline issues-
related. 
  
Fitness for duty is referred to the individual 
readiness, both physical and mental, to perform his 
or her duty without any influence such as drug and 
alcohol, or factors that can reduce the individual 
functional capability which can contribute to the risk 
of failure within an organisation. Physical/mental 
limitations account for those situations and instances 
where the task allocated to the employee exceeds his 
capabilities. Adverse physiological/mental state 
refers to medical (e.g. acute illness or injury) or 
mental (e.g. fatigue) conditions that preclude safe 
performance of the essential duties of the job.  
 
3.3.4 Unsafe Act 
 
These are the active failures within the organisation 
and are often observed at the sharp end. They are 
referred to as the actions and decisions of operators 
that directly influence or trigger the occurrence of an 
accident within a socio-technical system. Under this 
tier, slip, lapse, and mistake, and contravention are 
considered as causal factors.  Slips refer to failure of 
attention, memory, or technique. This type of error 
mostly happens with little or no conscious response 
during highly automated tasks. Lapse error occurs 
when there is a distraction of the sensory input 
visual, auditory, and olfactory, and the operator 
makes decisions based on the misinterpreted input. 
Mistakes are mostly knowledge-based errors that 
occur when the operator selects an incorrect/wrong 
procedure for a situation/task, or when solving a 
problem. Contraventions are intentional bending of 
rule and regulation or application of short-cut by the 
operator in the execution of his duties. Short-cuts are 
habitual deviations from the set rules and regulation 
and are most tolerable by management except when 
it yields an undesired outcome. Rule-bendings are 
isolated deviations from the set rule and are not 
acceptable by management. 
 
3.4 Exemplars of Causal Factors 
 
A list of causal factors under each tier was generated 
to be used as a guide during incident data coding and 
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investigation. Most mines in Ghana have a list of 
causal factors that serve as a guide during incident 
investigation in the identification of the possible 
causes of an accident. These lists were 
obtained from the mining industries, in addition to 
some possible causal factors of accidents within the 
mining sector from literature (Patterson, 2009). The 
authors then had a brainstorming section on 
grouping the list of causal factors under the tiers of 
the HFACS-GMI framework. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 
show a partial list of causal factors considered under 
each tier. 
 
Table 2 A list of External influences/factors Nano-codes 
 
Regulatory  
(i) Regulator’s failure to oversee site activities 
(ii) Infrequent/ inadequate inspections  
(iii) Inadequate/ambiguous regulations  
(iv) Inadequate enforcement of regulation 
(v) inadequate communication/coordination 
Political/Economic 
(i) Economic pressure to forgo-safety practice 
(ii) Workforce decrease due to economic pressure 
(iii) Political pressure  
(iv) Fear of prosecution/legal pressure 
(v) Workload increase due to economic pressure 
Industrial Standards 
(i) Deficiency in standard 
(ii) Standard applicability to sites 
 
 
Table 3 A List of Organisational Factors Nano-Codes 
 
Management Decisions  
(i) Inadequate staff training  
(ii) Inadequate contractor selection  
(iii) Excessive cost cutting  
(iv) Improper/inadequate PPEs  
(v) Inadequate adjustment/repair/maintenance 
(vi) Inadequate staffing/manning  
(vii) Inadequate monitoring of compliances 
Operational Process 
(i) Lack of SOP 
(ii) improper attempt to save time 
(iii) Outdated SOP 
(iv) Inadequate performance feedback 
(v) Improper work schedules  
(vi) Unclear definition of instruction/procedure  
(vii) Inadequate job hazard analysis 
 
Corporate Climate 
(i) Unclear chain of command  
(ii) No accountability of SOPs 
(iii) Inadequate enforcement of policies  
(iv) Uneasy access to workplace policies  
(v) Unclear/undefine organisational custom/values  
(vi) Inadequate organisational communication  
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Table 4 A List of Local Workplace/Individual Conditions Nano-Codes  
 
Leadership Flaw 
(i) Inadequate instructions, orientation and training 
(ii) Failure to ensure competency  
(iii) Inadequate identification/evaluation of loss 
exposure  
(iv) Encourage rule-bending/short-cuts  
(v) Failure to provide appropriate PPE 
(vi) Inadequate work planning or programming  
(vii) Disregarding of SOP  
 
Communication/coordination  
(i) Lack of teamwork 
(ii) Misinterpretation of instructions  
(iii) Inadequate communication of hazards  
(iv) Lack of coaching  
(v) Unavailable/ineffective communication method  
(vi) Inadequate communication between work peers  
(vii) Inadequate vertical communication between workers 
and leader  
(viii) Standard terminology not used  
Failure to access/correct Known Hazards 
(i) Inadequate hazard identification/assessment   
(ii) Failure to stop/correct unsafe acts or situation 
(iii) Failure to enforce/update SOPs, policies and 
procedures  
(iv) Failure to correct reported hazard 
(v) New process introduced without adequate training 
(vi) No or inadequate rest periods  
(vii) Poor pairing of crew members  
 
Physical Environment 
(i) Poor housekeeping  
(ii) Temperature extremes  
(iii) Inadequate or excess illumination 
(iv) Inadequate ventilation  
(v) Slippery floor, walkway, roadways 
(vi) Confined spaces  
(vii) Congestion or restricted action/motion  
Technological Environment  
(i) Inadequate guards and barriers  
(ii) Defective/dysfunctional tools and equipment  
(iii) Inadequate warning system 
(iv) Poor man-machine interfaces  
(v) Inadequate consideration of human factors or 
ergonomics  
(vi) Inadequate equipment and tool maintenance  
(vii) No installed or missing safety devices  
 
Fitness for Duty  
(i) Inadequate rest requirement  
(ii) Use of illicit drug/alcohol  
(iii) Overexertion of duty  
(iv) Lack of sleep  
(v) Lack of physical fitness  
 
Physical/Mental Limitation  
(i) Visual/vision/hearing deficiencies  
(ii) Memory failure  
(iii) Low learning aptitude  
(iv) Emotional disturbance  
(v) Temporary disabilities  
(vi) Inappropriate height, weight, size and strength reach 
Adverse Physiological/Mental State 
(i) Fatigue due to task load or duration  
(ii) Fatigue due to mental task load or speed  
(iii) Exposure to health hazard  
(iv) Constrained Movement  
(v) Conflicting/confusing demands/directions  
 
Table 5 A List of Unsafe Act Nano-codes  
Slip 
(i) Inadvertent operation of incorrect control 
(ii) Improper lifting/loading  
(iii) Poor reaction time 
(iv) Incorrect application of procedure  
(v) Omitted steps in a procedure  
(vi) Wrong isolation of equipment  
(vii) Failure to lower equipment attachment when 
parked 
Lapse 
(i) Misinterpretation of safety signs/warning  
(ii) Under/over estimation of object’s weight  
(iii) Misjudge surface/weather condition  
(iv) Misjudge work depth/height  
Mistake  
(i) Working at height without fall restraint/arrest  
(ii) Failure to use PPE properly 
(iii) Horseplay 
(iv) Serving equipment in operation  
(v) Wrong response to emergency situations  
(vi) Failure to identify hazard/risk 
(vii) Operating equipment without authority  
Contravention 
(i) Failure to use provided PPEs 
(ii) Fear to wear seatbelt  
(iii) Disregard of SOP, procedures and policies 
(iv) Entry into unauthorized area 
(v) Operating equipment without 
training/authorization  
(vi) Operating/equipment at speed greater than 
the set limit  
(vii) Violation of training rules and procedure  
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4 Conclusions  
 
This study sought to propose a classification system 
for investigation, analysis, and coding of incident 
data within the Ghanaian Mining Industry. A 
comparative study between AcciMap, STAMP, and 
HFACS reveal that the HFACS is most suitable for 
multiple incident data analysis and coding as well as 
quantify trends and pattern between causal factors. 
The comparative analysis also revealed that the 
HFACS yields high inter and intra-rater reliability 
than AcciMap and STAMP. HFACS-GMI was 
proposed after a thorough study of the original 
HFACS framework and its derivatives and 
consideration of recommendations proposed by 
several scholars. A partial list of causal factors nano-
codes were generated to serve as a guide during 
incident coding and investigation. The HFACS-
GMI is now at the developmental stage and requires 
a demonstration of its applicability, usefulness, and 
acceptance in the Ghanaian Mines. There is ongoing 
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